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Abstract—Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) is one of the most
widely used routing protocol to manage intra-domain routing.
OSPF has been identified with many serious security issues. LSA
falsification is one of the most critical vulnerability that can cause
route loop and black hole. Network operators need to rapidly
identity such anomalies. Network operators need also to identify
hardware failure. In this paper, we investigate the capability of
Recurrence Quantification Analysis (RQA), an advanced non-
linear statistical analysis technique, to identify OSPF anomalies.
We evaluate the capability of RQA to identify OSPF anomalies
using a controlled testbed where we introduced different types of
LSA falsifications as well as hardware failures. Our evaluation
shows that RQA can rapidly detect OSPF anomalies.
Index Terms—Intra-domain routing, OSPF, anomaly detection,
RQA, testbed, CORE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) has been designed to be
deployed within a single an Autonomous System (AS) where
an AS represents a large organisation or an Internet Service
Provider (ISP). OSPF is one of the most widely used interior
gateway protocols [1], [2]. It is a link-state routing protocol
where each router maintains a database that describes the
AS’s topology [3]. The main responsibility of OSPF routing
protocol is to allow all routers within an AS to construct their
routing tables and updates them when a change in the AS’s
topology occurs.
OSPF supports authentication where each link between
OSPF routers is associated with a shared key. However,
OSPF has been identified with a serious security issues [4].
Link State Advertisement (LSA) falsification is the most
well-known security issue. LSA falsification occurs when an
attacker sends a false LSA on behalf of the victim router
which can cause a serious impacts such as routing loop and
black hole. Although OSPF provides “fight-back” mechanism
by instantly sending LSA when OSPF routers receive a false
information in the LSAs which originated by them, different
types of LSA falsification overcome this mechanism [5], [1],
[6]. Monitoring such serious attacks and hardware failures is a
highly demanding for effective management and operation of
IP routing protocol [2]. This paper introduces a new approach
to detecting OSPF attacks and hardware failures which we
define them as OSPF anomalies.
Our approach is based on using Recurrence Quantification
Analysis (RQA) method. RQA is a non-linear statistical anal-
ysis method uses the concepts of phase plane trajectory [7].
RQA is a tool to extract hidden information from statistics
of dynamic non-linear systems [7]. To evaluate the ability of
RQA to detect OSPF anomalies, we use OSPF traffic obtained
from a controlled testbed where we introduced different types
of OSPF anomalies. Our evaluation shows the ability of RQA
to instantly identify different types of OSPF anomalies.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
introduces a brief background of OSPF and different types of
LSA updates. Section III outlines our approach using RQA. In
Section IV, we introduce our testbed and discuss the selection
of monitoring point to capture OSPF traffic. We evaluate our
approach to detecting OSPF attacks in Section V and finally
conclude our work in Section VI.
II. OSPF BACKGROUND
The Internet is a decentralized global network comprised of
tens of thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASes). An AS is a
set of routers under a single technical administration using an
Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) such as Open Shortest Path
First (OSPF) to communicate with other routers within the
AS and an Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) such as Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) to communicate with other ASes [8].
OSPF is one of the most widely used IGP. OSPF was firstly
described in RFC1131 and revised by RFC 2328 [3]. There
are two versions of OSPF, OSPF v2 supports IPv4 described
in [3] and OSPF v3 that supports IPv6 described in [9].
OSPF is a link state routing protocol where each OSPF
routers advertise the state of their links to their neighbor
routers. When an OSPF protocol is enabled for a particular
link, information associated with that router is added to the
local Link State Database (LSDB). Afterward the router sends
Hello messages on its operational links to determine whether
other link state routers are operating on the interfaces as well.
In addition to neighbor discovery purpose, Hello messages are
sent to maintain adjacencies between neighbor routers. After
establishing the adjacency between two OSPF routers, these
routers exchange a summarised LSDB. Each OSPF router
compares the received summary with its local LSDB to ensure
it is up to date. If one routers realize that it requires an update,
it will request the new information from the adjacency router.
OSPF instantly sends Link State Advertisement (LSA) mes-
sages to reflect a change in the topology and every 30 minutes
to refresh their routers database. These LSAs messages are
disseminated throughout the entire OSPF domain. There are
five LSA types which are summarised in Table I.
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF LSA TYPES
LSA type Description
Type-1 Router LSAs which describe the states of router’s
interfaces
Type-2 Network LSAs which describe the set of routers attached
to the network
Type-3 Summary LSAs which describe routers to networks
Type-4 Summary LSAs which describe routers to AS boundary
routers
Type-5 AS-external LSAs which describes routes to destinations
external to the AS
OSPF is a hierarchical routing protocol by supporting sub-
domains or areas. Dividing one domain into areas limits the
scope of LSAs flooding within the OSPF domain. OSPF
supports authentication and encryption. It also provides “fight-
back” mechanism when a router receives a false LSA that
was advertised by another router on its behalf, the router
immediately advertises a newer instance of the LSA which
cancels out the false one. However, OSPF has several known
security issues [1], [4], [6].
LSA falsification is the most critical security issue in OSPF.
It occurs when an attacker advertises an LSA with false link
information. False LSAs can be injected into the network from
a subverted router or common network host. If a false LSA is
accepted by at least one router, it allows the attacker to poison
the routers’ view of the AS topology and hence affecting its
routing table [4]. LSA falsifications are classified into self-
LSA falsification where a malicious router falsifies only its
own LSA and other–LSA falsification where the malicious
routers advertise a false LSA on behalf of other routers [?].
Early detection of OSPF attacks enables network operators to
protect their network from worst consequences such as denial
of service, eavesdropping and network delays. In addition to
OSPF attacks, rapidly detection of router and link failure in an
OSPF domain is of interest to network administrator. In this
paper, we refer to LSA falsification and hardware failures as
OSPF anomalies. In next section, we introduce our approach to
detect OSPF anomalies using a non-linear statistical analysis
technique.
III. A NON-LINEAR APPROACH TO IDENTIFY OSPF
ANOMALIES
Different methods and models for analysis of time series and
forecasting are available. The Fourier transform (FT) and the
Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model
are the most well-known for analysis and forecasting time
series. The FT and the ARIMA have some limitation for
analysis of time series. The FT has some limitations such
as time and frequency positions, non-stationarity or abrupt
changes in a signal can spread out for whole signal as well
as resolution. These drawbacks limit the application of the
FT in detecting short periods of anomalous OSPF behaviour.
The ARIMA model has two significant limitations: (1) future
values are assumed to be a linear function of past values and
(2) a large amount of historical data is required to obtain
reliable predictions [10].
Here, we use Recurrence Quantification Analysis (RQA),
a non-linear technique based on a phase plane trajectory, to
identify OSPF anomalies. RQA was introduced to quantify the
important aspects revealed by Recurrence Plot (RP), a graph-
ical method to display recurring patterns and non-stationarity
in time series.
A. Recurrence Plot
Recurrence Plot (RP) is a tool to visualise the time-
dependent behaviour of the dynamics of a system using the
concepts of phase plane trajectory, and simplifies interpretation
of recurrent data. With enough data, structural patterns in the
RP can reveal information about the time evolution of the
phase space. RP is not limited to long data sets. It can be
used for short, noisy, and non-stationary data sets [11]. RPs
can be formally expressed by the matrix
, (1)
where is an element of the recurrence matrix , N is the
number of measure points, is a threshold distance, the
Heaviside function and is a normalization operation.
To construct an RP, three parameters have to be carefully
selected. These are time delay , embedding dimension
, and the threshold . Selecting non-optimal values for
RP’s parameters can produce different structures for the same
input data. For example, non-optimal values of embedding
parameters can cause many interruptions to the Line of Identity
(LOI), a black main diagonal line with an angle in the RP.
To estimate time delay, the Auto-correlation function (ACF)
and Mutual Information (MI) are the most well-known meth-
ods to determine time delay. Unlike ACF which measures
linear correlation, MI measures both linear and non-linear
correlation. Therefore, we will use the MI method to determine
the time delay parameter. The first minimum value of MI
represents the value of time delay. For a periodic data, the
value of periodicity can be used as the value of time delay. The
embedding dimension parameter can be estimated using False
Nearest Neighbour (FNN), a tool for determining the proper
embedding dimension in dynamic systems. The FNN requires
the value of time delay which should be calculated first. Once
again, the first minimum value of FNN represents the value
embedding dimension. Although there is not a well-established
method to determine the optimal values of the threshold, the
value of threshold has to be selected to be as small as possible.
A recommendation from [7] suggests that the threshold has
to be selected less than 10% of the maximum phase space
diameter.
B. Recurrence Quantification Analysis
Interpreting an RP requires a high level of experience
especially for complex data. To reduce the difficulty of RP
interpretation, RQA has been introduced. In addition, RP
cannot be directly used for automated detection of system
behaviour changes or real-time anomaly detection. RQA has
been previously used to detect instability and anomalies in dif-
ferent disciplines such as physics, medicine, and engineering
[10], [12].
RQA provides several measures of complexity which are
described in Table II. These measurements demonstrate the
characteristics of systems at different times. For example,
RR refers to the probability that a system recurs after a
number of time states while TT can be used to measure
how long the system remains in a specific state [11]. Our
approach is based on on the concept that a significant change
in RQA measurements represents an indication for anomalous
behaviour in the underlying system behaviour that identify
anomalies.
TABLE II
A DESCRIPTION OF RQA MEASUREMENTS
RQA
measurements
Description
RR Measure the density of recurrence points in the RP
DET A measure based on diagonal lines of the RP
TT Contains information about the vertical structures in
the RP
T2 Measure the average lengths of the white vertical
lines in the RP
ENTR It is the Shannon entropy of the frequency
distribution of the diagonal line lengths
L-MAX A measurement that is based on diagonal lines of the
RP
L-MEAN Measure the average diagonal line length in the RP
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) is a real-
time network emulator. It supports routers, hosts and simulates
the network links between them [13]. CORE can provide a
realistic running of emulated networks with a relative inexpen-
sive hardware. CORE combines the ability of simulation tools
such as ns-3 [14] and emulation tools such as PlanetLab [15]
by emulating the network stack of routers or hosts through
virtualization, and simulating the links that connect them
together.
In this paper, we use the CORE in our experiment and
evaluation where the routers were configured to use OSPF
v2 with equal weights. We also use tcpdump, a Linux tool to
capture packets on a network interface, and Scapy, a Python-
based powerful interactive manipulation framework which is
able to decode a wide range of protocols [16], to filter OSPF
traffic.
A. Selecting Monitoring Point
OSPF routers send a periodic refresh of LSAs, even when
there is no change in the topology. The default value of the
refresh period is 30 minutes. In addition, OSPF routers flood
LSAs when there is a change in the network topology. For
example, when a link between two routers comes down, the
two routers have to originate and flood their LSAs with a
new link included in it. Although LSAs updates disseminate
through the entire OSPF domain, selecting a monitoring point
to capture LSA updates needs care.
In OSPF domain, networks can be classified into transit
and stub network. Transit network send and receive LSA
updates with other networks while stub network receive only
LSA update. Using OSPF traffic captured from transit network
might not reflect the actual behaviour. This can occur when
two OSPF routers within same area send an LSA update to
each other which are identical except LS age, an OSPF field
that specifies the age of the LSA in second. It is set to 0 when
the LSA is originated and incremented on every hop of the
flooding as well as they are held in each router’s database
[3]. In such a scenario, the LSA which have the smaller age
value should be accepted by the received router and this router
should acknowledge this LSA by sending an acknowledgment
update. To clarify such a scenario, consider Figure 1. In
this figure, R1 and R2 are two adjacencies OSPF routers.
In this scenario, there are three cases that can described the
exchanging of OSPF updates between R1 and R2.
LSA, age=4
Ack.
LSA, age=4
Ack.
LSA, age=5
LSA, age=4
Ack.
LSA, age=3
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
R1 R2
Fig. 1. An example of sending OSPF traffic between two nodes
Case 1. R1 or R2 sends an LSA update and the other router
acknowledges it. Such a case can be seen in stub
routers.
Case 2. R1 sends an LSA with age 4 and R2 sends the
same LSA but with age 5. Although R2 sent LSA
after R1, R2 has to acknowledge the LSA sent by
R1 as it has a smaller age value.
Case 3. R1 sends an LSA with age 4 and R2 sends the
same LSA but with age 3. R1 discards the LSA
that sent and will acknowledge the LSA sent by
R2 as it has a smaller age value.
As we can see from case 2 and 3, there are extra information
sent between the two nodes. This can produce inaccurate rep-
resentation for system behaviour. Therefore, we will monitor
OSPF traffic by using LSA updates sent by stub network.
(a) Topology-1 (b) Topology-2
Fig. 2. Investigating the effect of topology and number of peers on RQA parameters
B. Estimating RQA parameters
In this section, we explore if the estimation values of RQA
parameters (time delay, embedding dimension, and the thresh-
old) depends on the topology and number of OSPF routers
for an OSPF network. In other words, does the topology and
number of OSPF routers in a single OSPF area can change the
characteristics of RP for OSPF traffic? For that purpose, we
adopt different topologies. In each topology, we monitor OSPF
traffic on different routers. The purpose of this investigation is
to find out if we can use (generalise) RQA parameters for any
topologies or we need to find out these parameters for every
topology.
A recommendation from Cisco that number of OSPF routers
in a single OSPF area should have no more than 50 routers
and for areas that suffer from unstable links should be even
smaller [17]. Therefore, we will use 20 routers and 35 routers
in our adopted topology taking in our consideration different
number of peers per OSPF router. Figure 2 show examples of
two used topologies. For example, in topology 1 the maximum
number of peers is 4 while in topology 2 is 6. Whatever the
number of OSPF routers and number of peers per OSPF router,
we can see that the characteristic of OSPF traffic per OSPF
router shows similar RQA measurements ( , , and
).
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate the capability of RQA to identify OSPF anoma-
lies, we apply our RQA approach to OSPF traffic collected
from a control testbed. RQA measurements change to reflect
changes in the underlying system traffic [18]. Our approach
is based on an assumption that a significant change in one of
RQA measurements represents an indication for identifying
OSPF anomalies.
We use two types of anomalies. These are a hardware
failure, link or a node failure, and different types of OSPF
attacks. In both type of anomalies we use the topology shown
in Figure 3. We start our evaluation using a hardware failure.
A. Hardware Failure
In this section, we introduce multiple link failures by
shutting down multiple interfaces on multiple OSPF routers
and capture LSA updates from multiple monitoring points.
To get an accurate evaluation in term of time and sequence,
we build an automation script that introduces multiple failures
on routers. These routers are abr1 and r6 which have been
selected based on their locations in the OSPF area. We start
our experiments by shutting down interface eth0 of abr1 and
ending with turning up eth0 of abr1 and eth1 of r6 as shown in
Figure 4. The time delay between each event is 4 hours (14400
seconds). We capture OSPF traffic from multiple monitoring
points including rcs1, r7, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15, and r16 and
originated by abr1. Figure 5 shows number of all LSAs and
LSAs type-1 per second captured from multiple monitoring
points.
Although OSPF updates have captured from stub networks,
the total number of all LSA updates and LSA updates type-
1 per second are not identical. This is due to LSA updates
arrive to the monitoring points at different time stamps. For
example, Figure 6 shows number of all LSA updates captured
by OSPF routers rcs1 and r16 where we can see how LSA
updates arrived at different time stamps. However, the total
number of LSA updates captured at all multiple monitoring
points are equal.
Furthermore, the number of all LSAs and LSAs type-1
captured from OSPF router r14 shows different behaviour
where there is no OSPF updates during the period 72001-
86402 seconds. This is due to the introduced hardware failure
Fig. 3. An example of sending OSPF traffic between two nodes
Fig. 4. An example of sending OSPF traffic between two nodes
at time stamp 72000 seconds. As a result of losing connection
between r14 and r6, there were no LSAs during the period
72001-86402 seconds. We can also see that at time 86403
seconds that there are 3 LSAs captured by r14 and advertised
by abr1. The extra one LSA is due to when the adjacency
between r6 and r14 going up, r14 sends a link state request
packet. This packet is sent to request the pieces of the r6’s
database that are more up to date [3].
Before calculating RQA measurements for the captured
OSPF traffic, we sample LSA updates every 10 seconds as a
bin size. RQA measurements then calculated every bin using
200 bins as a history. Figures 7 and 8 shows number of all
LSAs and LSAs type-1 captured from rcs1 and advertised by
abr1 and their corresponding values of RQA measurements
respectively. RQA is able to identify hardware failure within
2 bins size (20 seconds) as shown in Figure 9. Although RQA
shows its ability to rapidly identify interfaces shutting down
on different routers as well as turning up multiple interfaces on
different routers, it does not able to identify multiple shutting
down for multiple interfaces on different routers, the event at
time stamp 7200 bins.
B. OSPF Attacks
In this section, we evaluate the ability of RQA to detect
the most well known OSPF attacks. Partitioning attack [6],
disguised attack [5], and adjacency spoofing attack [1] are
the most well known OSPF attacks. Partitioning attack is
an example of self-LSA falsification attacks while disguised
and adjacency spoofing attacks are examples of other-LSA
falsification. The consequences of these attacks can cause
routing loop, long routes, routers become disconnected, and
link overload as a result of diverting large volume of traffic
through a limited capacity link [5], [6].
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Fig. 5. Number of all LSAs and LSAs type-1 captured by different monitoring points
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Fig. 6. An example of arriving LAS updates to monitoring points at different time stamps
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Fig. 7. Number of all LSAs advertised by abr1 and its corresponding values
of RQA measurements
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Fig. 8. Number of LSAs type-1 advertised by abr1 and its corresponding
values of RQA measurements
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Fig. 9. An example of capability of RQA to rapidly identify OSPF failure
Once again, we use an automation script that introduces the
three well known attacks. We introduced disguised, adjacency,
and partitioning attacks at time stamps 2485, 5012, and 9532
seconds respectively. We assume r8 is the compromised router
for disguised and partitioning attacks while host2 is the com-
promised host. Figure 10 shows the total number of all LSA
updates advertised by r9 OSPF router and its corresponding
measurements of RQA. In this example, we can see that
W-entr measurement shows a significant change during the
attackers time while in hardware failure RR was the significant
measurement that identifies the failures. This observation can
be used for further research in term of differentiate between
type of anomalies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
OSPF is an intra-domain routing protocol that has been
widely deployed for the last two decades. Different types of
attacks exploit OSPF vulnerability. LSA falsification is one of
the most serious attacks that threaten OSPF protocol. Rapid
identification OSPF anomalies helps to mitigate the effect of
OSPF from worse consequences such as route loop and black
hole. In this paper, we show that RQA can be used to identify
such anomalies. We evaluate the capability of RQA using data
collected from a controlled testbed where different types of
OSPF anomalies were introduced. Our evaluation shows that
RQA is able to rapidly identify OSPF anomalies.
Our feature work will involve evaluate the capability of
RQA to identify anomalies in a series of OSPF traffic orig-
inated by all OSPF routers. Our further research includes
investigation the capability of RQA to differentiate between
different OSPF anomalies.
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